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EVIDENCE FOR GOD FROM CERTAINTY
Katherin A. Rogers
Human beings can have “strongly certain” beliefs—indubitable, veridical 
beliefs with a unique phenomenology—about necessarily true propositions 
like 2+2=4. On the plausible assumption that mathematical entities are platonic 
abstracta, naturalist theories fail to provide an adequate causal explanation 
for such beliefs because they cannot show how the propositional content of 
the causally inert abstracta can fi gure in a chain of physical causes. Theories 
which explain such beliefs as “corresponding” to the abstracta, but without 
any causal relationship, entail impossibilities. God, or a very god-like being, 
provides the best causal explanation for such beliefs.
The fact that human beings can have indubitable beliefs about necessar-
ily true propositions is evidence for the existence of God because the best 
causal explanation for the existence of such beliefs involves positing a be-
ing with two properties which, in combination, render their possessor at 
least god-like. This being has the sort of causal power that could produce 
beliefs in human minds, and it somehow possesses (or has immediate 
access to) necessarily true propositions necessarily. Aspects of the physi-
cal universe might have the former property, but nothing in the physical 
universe possesses the latt er. I will focus on a specifi c sort of certainty and 
on beliefs about mathematical propositions. Some of the claims on which 
I base my argument are controversial, but they are defensible and worthy 
of consideration.
I will take it as a datum to be explained that human beings sometimes 
have “strongly certain” beliefs. I am using “belief” in a rough and general 
way such that it is legitimate to refer to an instance of knowledge or a 
rational intuition as a “belief.” A more fi ne-grained analysis might dis-
tinguish between “belief” and knowledge or the sort of “seeming” that 
constitutes rational intuition, but the catch-all term serves my purposes 
here. A strongly certain belief is characterized by several features. First it 
is veridical. It is held with a certainty such that having the belief entails 
the truth of the proposition believed. A variety of diﬀ erent epistemologies 
might allow room for such a certainty, and I do not need to fi ll out my con-
ception in accord with one rather than another. My argument can proceed 
so long as it is granted that there are some beliefs which are held in such a 
way that what is believed cannot be false.
In addition to being veridical, introspection suggests that, as occurrent, 
strongly certain beliefs possess a set of properties which bestow upon 
them a recognizably unique phenomenology. I do not propose a complete 
description of the experience of having a strongly certain belief, and it is 
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plausible to think that there may be real characteristics which are too subtle 
to distinguish consciously, but which contribute to the felt sui generis na-
ture of the strongly certain belief. There are, however, two key properties 
which can be isolated and described. First, strongly certain belief will be 
“luminous.” That is, if I am strongly certain that x, then I know that I know 
that x. And secondly—though I think this quality is intimately related to 
the fi rst, and perhaps really just another aspect of a single phenomenon—
strongly certain belief will be “immediate.” It will be characterized by a 
direct recognition perhaps best described phenomenologically through 
the standard metaphors of intuition, a “seeing” or “grasping” of the object 
or content of the belief. This sense of immediacy is only strengthened by 
careful consideration. With perception one might prima facie have some 
sense of immediately “seeing” one’s monitor screen, but upon being told 
about one’s eyes, photons, etc. one will grant that there is at the very least 
a many-linked causal story to tell connecting one’s seeing and one’s moni-
tor. Strong certainty is not like that. There are no intermediaries between 
the intellectual “seeing” and the content seen, and careful consideration 
of the experience of “seeing” the content of one’s belief only confi rms the 
experience of immediacy.
The claim that some beliefs are held with strong certainty does not 
entail that every human thinker has strongly certain beliefs. Perhaps 
some people have none. Nor does it entail that if one person believes 
a proposition with strong certainty, then anyone who understands that 
proposition must also hold it with strong certainty. It should be noted 
that there are many reasonable analyses of what it means to be “certain” 
of some belief which fall short of strong certainty. On these analyses it 
is consistent that “I am certain that x” and yet it is not the case that x. In 
that situation the phenomenology of my belief would diﬀ er from that of 
a strongly certain belief—I would not know that I know x, and I would 
not “grasp” x immediately. Call instances of less-than-strong certainty, 
“weak” certainty.
A paradigm instance of a strongly certain belief is, “I exist.” If I am 
strongly certain right now that I exist, then it is true that I exist. And I know 
that I know I exist. Timothy Williamson mounts an att ack on the claim to 
luminosity in many of the standard examples, but even Williamson has 
to grant the possibility of a few luminous beliefs including “that one ex-
ists.”1 Moreover I “grasp” my own existence, I “see” myself with a sort of 
pure immediacy. Here it seems to me that my cognitive access to myself fi ts 
the sort of experience which William Alston calls intuitive knowledge. He 
quotes H. H. Price to the eﬀ ect that “such knowledge ‘is simply the situa-
tion in which some entity or some fact is directly present to consciousness.’” 
Alston goes on to explain, “I cannot be in the state of knowledge that p so 
construed, without its being the case that p; for that state just consists of the 
presence of that fact to my consciousness; without that fact there could be 
no such state. Knowledge is not a state that could be just what it is intrinsi-
cally without the actual existence of the object; it has no intrinsic character 
over and above the presence of that object to consciousness.”2
It seems to me that, in addition to being strongly certain that I exist, I 
have strongly certain beliefs about some necessary truths, like the basic 
laws of logic and some of the simpler mathematical propositions.3 In 
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this paper I will focus on strongly certain mathematical belief. The prob-
lem of the causes of knowledge of mathematical truth has already been 
discussed by philosophers of mathematics, and looking at how they 
frame the question will be useful. The content of strongly certain belief 
in simple mathematical propositions is interestingly diﬀ erent from the 
case of “I exist.” In addition to my “grasp” of the bare proposition, like 
“2+2=4,” there is recognition of the necessity of the proposition. It seems 
to me that this recognition of the necessity is included in the grasping of 
“2+2=4.” A child might understand that “2+2=4” without understanding 
what it means for some proposition to be necessarily true, but if the child 
does not see that “2+2=4” in such a way that he automatically applies it in 
any instance, he does not really grasp it. If he really gets “2+2=4,” a bit of 
Socratic questioning would soon elicit the fact that he sees that “2+2=4” 
must be true always and everywhere. So if I have a strongly certain belief 
that “2+2=4,” and recognition that this is a necessary truth is included in 
that belief, then 2+2 does equal 4 necessarily, I know that I know this, and 
I have an immediate grasp of it.
It should be admitt ed fi rst, though, that there are philosophers who deny 
the possibility of strong certainty. There are those—Quine springs to mind—
who insist that even the claims of mathematics do not constitute necessary 
truth. “The proverbial necessity of mathematical truth resides merely in our 
exempting the mathematical sentences when choosing which one of a re-
futed block of sentences to revoke. We exempt them because changing them 
would reverberate excessively through science.”4 This sort of fallibilism is a 
diﬃ  cult thesis to defend, however. Either the fallibilist oﬀ ers an argument 
for his position or he does not. If he does not, then we have no reason to ac-
cept his counterintuitive conclusion that even apparently necessary truths 
like 2+2=4 might be false. But if he does give an argument, then it will have 
premises, and the premises will inevitably be more dubious than the claim 
that 2+2=4 is a necessary truth. Quine’s story about belief acquisition begins, 
“Our intake of information about the world consists only of the triggering 
of our nerve endings by light rays and molecules from our environment,” 
and goes on to make a series of claims about conditioning, animal expecta-
tions, the molding infl uence of evolution, language acquisition, etc.5 This 
story about belief acquisition concludes to, among other things, the point 
about the in-principle-revokable nature of our mathematical commitments. 
But any of these claims is far, far more dubious than “ ‘2+2=4’ cannot possi-
bly be false.” One can read Quine’s epistemic story as a version of a fallibilist 
argument. If this causal story of how we come to any and all of our beliefs is 
correct, then it follows that any belief, including 2+2=4, is revokable. If this 
argument is valid—in a sense that is the claim of the present paper—then 
it seems a reductio showing that this causal story of how we come to our 
beliefs must be mistaken. Any argument for this skepticism about necessary 
truth must face the same sort of criticism, mutatis mutandis.
A more moderate fallibilist might say that there are necessary truths, 
but we have no infallible way to recognize them. We cannot know that 
we know, and we do not have the sort of “grasping of the content” that 
strong certainty entails. To such a one I can only respond that I fi nd my-
self incapable of entertaining the belief that I might be wrong about 2+2 
equaling 4. Perhaps the fault lies with my imagination or perhaps the 
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more moderate fallibilist simply holds the belief that 2+2=4 in a somewhat 
diﬀ erent way than I do.
It seems to me that I have a strongly certain belief that 2+2=4, and I can 
only ask the reader to introspect regarding his own beliefs. The question 
I want to address is, how did I come to have such a belief? My belief itself 
is a contingent phenomenon, and therefore it has a cause. I will argue that 
such an eﬀ ect is most plausibly ascribed to God (or a god-like being). It is 
important here to distinguish between the causal question which I am ask-
ing, and the diﬀ erent, epistemic, question of how I can trust my belief that 
2+2=4. I am not engaged in the sort of project which occupied Descartes in 
the First Meditation. Descartes holds that one could be brought to doubt 
even the simple rules of arithmetic if presented with the hypothesis of the 
evil genius. And then it is only by eliminating that hypothesis through the 
introduction of God that we can defeat skepticism.
The claim that the evil genius might deceive even with regard to what 
is most clearly and distinctly perceived generates the famous criticism of 
Descartes known as the Cartesian circle: How can we possibly mount an 
argument for knowledge of God, or anything else, if we have cast our 
most fundamental beliefs and our basic noetic abilities into doubt? Unlike 
Descartes I am not invoking God to solve some problem of ubiquitous 
doubt. In positing strongly certain belief in the basic laws of logic and 
simple mathematical propositions I deny Descartes’ skeptical claim about 
these necessary truths. Mark Heller suggests this move as a solution to the 
Cartesian circle and argues that it follows that it is not necessary to intro-
duce God to improve our epistemic status with regard to what is clearly 
and distinctly perceived.6 That seems to me to be correct. If I have strongly 
certain belief that 2+2=4, my epistemic status regarding that belief really 
couldn’t get any bett er. I need no further justifi cation. My simply having it 
is suﬃ  cient to my epistemic needs. Though my discussion has epistemic 
ramifi cations, I am not asking about justifi cation or reliability. Rather I am 
asking a question about adequate explanation: How did I come to have 
this (inherently justifi ed, completely reliable) strongly certain belief?
My argument, then, is not of the same sort as Plantinga’s in Chapter 12 
of Warrant and Proper Function, where the naturalist hypothesis is seen as a 
defeater for the reliability of belief. My argument is closer to Augustine’s in 
Book 2 of On Free Will: The evident fact of our knowledge of mathematical 
truth, which knowledge could not have its source in the contingent physi-
cal universe, shows that there is an eternal, immutable, and transcendent 
realm of such truth which must be identifi ed with God.
The distinction between the question of epistemic reliability, which 
I am not addressing, and the question of adequate causal explanations 
is so important that perhaps a simple analogy will help to reinforce it. 
Suppose it is a metaphysical necessity that Snickers Bars have peanuts. 
Suppose I (occurrently) know that this is the case. Then if I know I have 
a Snickers Bar in my hand, I know I have a candy bar with peanuts in my 
hand. Here the peanuts correspond to the veridical nature of the strongly 
certain belief. If I have a strongly certain belief I cannot even entertain the 
possibility of its being false. Period.
If I take my Snickers Bar as “given” then I need not look for some ad-
ditional explanation for the presence of the peanuts. But Snickers Bars 
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are contingent. I might demand a causal explanation for the Snickers Bar 
itself, and the fact of the peanuts might play an important role in shaping 
my causal theory. Suppose I hypothesize that the candy bar factory down 
the street provides an adequate causal explanation for the existence of the 
Snickers Bar. But suppose I discover that, while the factory does produce 
various sorts of candy bars, nothing in the factory is capable of inputt ing 
peanuts. I will not decide that this Snickers Bar does not have peanuts, 
since I see that it does and I believe that it must. I am committ ed to the 
metaphysical necessity of peanuts in Snickers Bars. But since I know this 
Snickers Bar has peanuts, and I know that the factory down the street 
cannot produce candy bars with peanuts, I know that it is not the cause of 
the Snickers Bar. I must look elsewhere for an explanation—I must fi nd a 
factory which has the capacity to add peanuts to candy bars.
I do not question the reliability of my strongly certain beliefs, but they 
are contingent phenomena, and so I aim to fi nd a causal explanation for 
their existence. But an adequate causal explanation will involve causal 
factors which are capable of producing beliefs that have the inherently 
veridical nature and the unique phenomenology of strong certainty. I will 
argue that naturalistic causal theories fail to explain all that needs explain-
ing. By “naturalism” I mean the view that the only things with causal 
power are things which are part of the spatio-temporal universe. By this 
defi nition a “naturalist” might believe in non-causal platonic abstracta. 
I will focus on mathematical beliefs since contemporary discussion of 
mathematical platonism has already brought some relevant diﬃ  culties 
with naturalism to light. 7
For the time being I will assume that mathematical entities are platonic 
abstracta and that mathematical truths like “2+2=4” are about abstract ob-
jects, though at the end of the paper, when the topic is the relationship of 
God to mathematical truth, some qualifi cations will be proposed. In any 
case mathematical truths are about some sort of “things” which are not 
spatio-temporal and are not aspects of the physical universe. Certainly 
this is controversial.8 But the alternative to platonism is to suggest that 
numbers, for example, are aspects of the physical universe. And then it 
should follow that they might come into or go out of being with the birth 
and death of the universe as we know it, or that it would not have been the 
case that 2+2=4 if some radically diﬀ erent physical universe, or none at all, 
had existed. My strong certainty that 2+2=4 entails that it is not possible 
that 2+2=4 fail to obtain, and so any att empt to see this mathematical truth 
as an aspect of the changing and inherently contingent physical universe 
must be rejected.
If mathematical entities are platonic abstracta then presumably they are 
causally inert. How then to oﬀ er a causal explanation for strongly certain 
beliefs, given that the human knower is located in time and space?9 The 
diﬃ  culty lies in the fact that an adequate theory of the causes of knowl-
edge must presumably allow for the content of the knowledge, the thing 
known, to play some role in the causal explanation. This is a common 
claim. A theory of the causes of perceptual knowledge which held that the 
objects of perception are entirely outside of the causal chain producing the 
knowledge would seem a very odd theory. Could it even be considered 
an explanation of my seeing a tree, if no tree at all were involved in the 
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explanation? The point can be put even a bit more strongly if one assumes 
something like a Kripkean analysis of meaning and reference in which a 
“chain of communication” reaching back to the thing being referred to is 
a necessary part of establishing the very meaning of a term such that belief 
would be impossible without the causal connection.10 Later in this paper 
I will have occasion to revisit this assumption that an adequate causal 
theory of knowledge must involve some connection between the knower 
and the known, even when the known is necessary truth, but let it stand 
for now.
Could we argue that the theory of evolution oﬀ ers a causal explanation 
which can successfully relate the knower to the known in such a way as to 
explain strongly certain belief? The standard (radically simplifi ed) evolu-
tionary story about the causes of beliefs which have epistemic reliability 
goes something like this: (1) Eons of evolution have produced human 
beings with belief-producing mechanisms. (2) These belief-producing 
mechanisms produce beliefs that are likely to be “useful” (i.e., will help 
the believer survive and reproduce). (3) Beliefs that are useful are likely 
to be true. So evolution produces reliably true beliefs.
Even some staunch defenders of natural proofs for the existence of God 
hold that evolution is adequate to explain how our true beliefs come to be. 
In Is There a God? Richard Swinburne argues that Darwinism is adequate 
to explain the connection between the believer and the world. How would 
this come about?
The answer is evident: animals with beliefs are more likely to survive 
if their beliefs are largely true. False beliefs—for example, about the 
location of food or predators—will lead to rapid elimination in the 
struggle for food or predators [sic]. If you believe that there is no 
table present, when there is one, you will fall over it, and so on. Those 
in whom the brain states which give rise to beliefs are connected by 
causal chains to the outside world, in such a way that the causal chain 
is normally only activated by a state of aﬀ airs which causes the brain 
state which in turn causes the belief that the state of aﬀ airs holds, will 
normally hold true beliefs about the world and in consequence be 
more likely to survive.11
Recently philosophers from very diﬀ erent camps have raised serious 
doubts that evolution could really be expected to produce epistemically 
reliable cognitive faculties.12 But for the purposes of my argument I can 
grant that evolution is the source of mechanisms which produce beliefs 
which are likely to be useful and hence are likely to be true, especially 
when the issue is food or predators. But what about strongly certain belief 
that 2+2=4? A very pressing problem is this: Given that this content is caus-
ally inert, what could possibly “activate” the causal chain which causes the 
brain state which causes the belief? I will return to this below in discussing 
Nagel. First I will focus on a somewhat diﬀ erent issue regarding the spe-
cial status of strongly certain beliefs—their inherently veridical nature and 
unique phenomenology which includes luminosity and immediacy.
In the evolutionary story nature produced beliefs which are “likely to 
be useful and hence true.” But that likely entails “possibly not useful and, 
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even if useful, possibly not true.” For any given belief produced through 
this mechanism it is possible that it is not really a useful belief. Roger 
Penrose suggests that mathematical beliefs may have arisen as an acciden-
tal, and potentially harmful, side-eﬀ ect of the useful ability to understand 
about food and predators. He oﬀ ers a splendid cartoon in which a brainy 
pre-historic fellow is having a moment of illumination with respect to 
Mammoth hunting, while his (even brainier) compadre studies geometry 
in the dirt, unaware that he is about to be pounced on by a saber-toothed 
tiger.13 One could even argue that, unlikely as it seems, whole categories of 
beliefs, perhaps all beliefs, are mere epiphenomena which play no genu-
ine causal role in the survival and reproduction of the believer.
The connection between “produced by eons of evolution” and “useful” 
seems likely, but is not necessary. It is possible that any given belief, or 
even the whole belief-producing mechanism, may fail to be useful. The 
connection between “useful” and “true” in the evolutionary story is not 
necessary either. One could tell many a plausible tale in which holding 
systematically false beliefs, perhaps about one’s own talents and impor-
tance, proves more useful for the metaphorical “purposes” of evolution 
than believing the truth would have done. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that in general the beliefs that seem useful, are useful, and that the reason 
they are useful is that they are true. But the evolutionary causal story, if it 
is indeed the story of how we come by all of our beliefs, seems to entail the 
possibility that none of our beliefs are useful, and the possibility that none 
of them are true. But given that I am strongly certain that 2+2=4 I know 
it is not possible that all my beliefs are false. The causal story which ap-
peals to purely naturalistic evolutionary processes proposes that all of our 
beliefs—the true and the false beliefs about contingent phenomena, and 
the true and the false beliefs about necessary truths (I might easily have a 
false belief about a complex arithmetical proposition)—are the eﬀ ects of 
the same evolutionary processes. But this causal explanation fails for our 
strongly certain beliefs because there is nothing in the story to account for 
the inherently veridical nature of these beliefs.
Moreover there is no explanation for the unique phenomenology of 
the strongly certain beliefs. If all of our beliefs are the eﬀ ects of the same 
causes, whence the luminosity and the immediacy of the strongly certain 
beliefs given that these properties do not, could not, characterize other, less 
certain beliefs? A causal story which connects the knower to the known 
through the usefulness of belief seems ill-suited to explaining the fact that 
I “know that I know,” when it seems obvious that luminosity would not 
contribute to a belief’s enabling the believer to reproduce. Further, the 
evolutionary story ought to undermine the sense of immediacy which is 
part of the experience of strong certainty. It proposes that I believe that 
2+2=4 because eons of evolution favored the survival of those who held 
that sort of belief. This suggests a long, involved causal chain, where none 
of the links consists in any immediate “grasping” 2+2=4. But this story 
strikes me as doubtful, whereas I do “see” that 2+2=4. Unlike with per-
ceptual knowledge, this causal theory does not incline me to reassess the 
immediacy of my “seeing” that 2+2=4. Instead I conclude that something 
is lacking from the causal story. And, fi nally, remember that the strongly 
certain belief concerning “2+2=4” recognizes the necessity of the claim. 
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The evolutionary account oﬀ ers no explanation for our modal knowl-
edge, since it seems clear that recognizing the contingency or necessity of 
certain propositions does not play a role in our success as reproducers.14
Thomas Nagel agrees that the processes of evolution are not suﬃ  cient 
to explain true belief, but goes on to dismiss the “religious proposal” in 
favor of,
some systematic aspect of the natural order that would make the 
appearance of minds in harmony with the universe something to be 
expected. . . . [There] are specifi c conditions of the primordial state of 
our universe that, given its general laws, will lead to the formation 
of molecules, galaxies, organisms, consciousness, and intelligence. 
My hypothesis is only that the laws are such as to make not only the 
fi rst but also the last of these developments intelligible, given the 
initial conditions that lead to the development of some organisms 
or other.15
But what, in the physical universe, might “activate” a causal chain result-
ing in strongly certain belief? Nagel grants that the story which hopes to 
explain the reliability of belief through their evolutionary “use” is not likely 
to succeed. Still, there must be some causal explanation of belief, and pre-
sumably it must point to some connection between the belief and its con-
tent. Whatever one might hope for from a “systematic aspect of the natural 
order” which explains “minds in harmony with the universe,” it seems 
overly optimistic to expect to discover a connection between the minds 
and platonic abstracta which would allow strong certitude concerning the 
necessary truth of 2+2=4. The natural order, a contingent phenomenon, 
simply is not in a position to bridge the gap between itself and the world 
of necessary abstracta. The evolutionary causal story for strong certainty 
fails because the att empt to trace the cause of true beliefs through the evo-
lutionary development of useful beliefs cannot explain the special nature 
of the strongly certain belief. But any naturalist story must suﬀ er an even 
more fundamental failure. If there are platonic abstracta and necessary 
truths, then they are not aspects of the contingent, physical universe, and 
therefore if the causal processes which produce the molecules, the galaxies 
etc. are purely physical, they cannot supply a connection between the con-
tingent knower and the abstract, necessary, known. A platonic abstractum 
cannot “activate” a spatio-temporal causal chain. That being the case, there 
will be no naturalist causal explanation for the veridical nature, the lumi-
nosity, and the immediacy of the strongly certain belief in a necessary truth 
like 2+2=4. (George Bealer’s analysis of rational intuition may reinforce this 
point when he argues that intuition, “intellectual seeing,” and perceptual 
seeing, by and large, cannot overlap. He writes, “most things that can seem 
intellectually to be so cannot seem sensorily to be so, and conversely.”)16
But perhaps the naturalist can deny my assumption that the causal 
explanation of the strongly certain belief must show some sort of causal 
connection between the knower and the known, between the belief and 
its content. Seeing that there can be no “natural” causal connection be-
tween the knower and the abstracta known, the naturalist might argue 
that there can be strongly certain beliefs, like the belief that 2+2=4, which 
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are amenable to a causal explanation in which the abstract content simply 
does not play a role. Perhaps our strongly certain beliefs are just “thrown 
up” somehow, with no connection to the abstracta, and yet nonetheless, 
what “grounds” our strong certitude is the fact that the proposition about 
the platonic abstracta is true. Let us say that our beliefs are caused only 
by natural processes. Once you have explained the natural processes you 
have given a complete explanation for the existence of the belief. Some of 
our beliefs are held with strong certainty and are about platonic abstracta. 
We have strong certainty because the proposition is true, but there is ab-
solutely no causal connection of any sort between the belief and the true 
proposition. There is simply a correspondence. And that is enough.17
First it is important to remember that I am not asking what it is that 
“makes” strongly certain beliefs reliable. Suppose the naturalist claims 
that “Any causal explanation which is suﬃ  cient to explain the existence 
of our strongly certain beliefs is suﬃ  cient to explain their veridical nature 
(absolute reliability), luminosity, and immediacy.” I agree. Any causal ex-
planation which is suﬃ  cient to explain the existence of a Snickers Bar is 
suﬃ  cient to explain its having peanuts. In cases like “2+2=4” it is right to 
say that, “whatever explains the undeniable fact that we have intuitions 
with specifi c contents, suﬃ  ces as an explanation of the actual reliability of 
our intuitions as it surely excludes contradictory content.”18
My question, however, is not what explains the reliability of the strong-
ly certain belief, but what explains the strongly certain belief. Not just 
any explanation will do. Suppose Anne expresses her puzzlement over 
the source of her strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 to her mother. And 
suppose her mother answers that the complete causal explanation for 
Anne’s belief is that when sentences are inscribed on crystal tablets and 
then the tablets are ground up and fed to small children, the children will 
come to believe what was writt en on the tablets with strong certainty. 
Anne ingested the ground crystal bearing the sentence “2+2=4” with her 
strained peas, and that is why she believes 2+2=4 with strong certainty. 
Hearing this odd theory about its cause will not shake Anne’s commit-
ment to that belief that 2+2=4. Whatever caused the belief, the belief is true, 
luminous, and immediate. But is the strained pea theory adequate as a 
causal explanation for the belief?
The strained pea theory suggests several serious questions. Ordinarily 
in our thinking about belief acquisition the digestive system plays litt le if 
any role because it presumably is not the part of the person which receives 
the sort of data which can be processed as information. Anne’s mother 
might respond that Anne has made a mistake in assuming that the causes 
of strongly certain belief must involve the reception of data like the causes 
of other sorts of beliefs. Anne might note that the actual scratchings on the 
crystal, in the form of the Arabic numerals we use, are merely symbols 
without inherent meaning and could not possibly convey any concept to 
an infant. Anne’s mother might respond that Anne is still making the mis-
take of assuming that the content of the belief must fi gure somehow in the 
cause of the belief. Anne’s mother admits that the scratchings on the crys-
tal do not somehow “contain” the actual content, 2+2=4, but her contention 
is this: the fact that 2+2=4 has no causal role to play in the production of 
Anne’s belief.
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Anne might respond that divorcing the content of 2+2=4 from the causes 
which produce the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 leads to impossible con-
sequences. On the strained pea theory, “2+2=5” could have been inscribed 
on the crystal, and then, according to the theory; she, Anne, would have 
the strongly certain belief that 2+2=5. But that is impossible. Anne’s mother 
might argue that the latt er point is irrelevant, since in fact it was “2+2=4” 
that Anne ingested with her peas. But Anne’s criticism is not refuted. The 
theory entails that “2+2=5” really could have been scratched on the crystal, 
and then that Anne would have had a strongly certain belief that 2+2=5. 
But a strongly certain belief that 2+2=5 is an impossibility. A theory which 
entails an impossibility is not a good theory.
The naturalist’s proposed “correspondence” theory is subject to roughly 
the same problems as the strained pea theory. The correspondence theory 
proposes that the belief that 2+2=4 is correct because it corresponds to the 
truth, and it is inherently reliable, but the fact that 2+2=4 plays no role in the 
causal history of the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4. The belief itself can 
be completely causally explained by naturalistic factors. As in the strained 
pea theory, there is no causal connection between the knower and the 
known, but, according to the correspondence theory, that doesn’t matt er.
The fi rst claim, echoing Anne to her mother, is that it is standard to 
suppose that knowledge requires some sort of causal connection be-
tween the knower and the known. This is certainly true of perceptual 
knowledge. Suppose we were to tell a correspondence story of the causes 
of perception. There is no causal connection at all between the object 
“seen” and the experience of seeing it. Rather, natural processes hap-
pen to have produced the experiences of seeing certain objects, and they 
happen to have produced the actual existence of those objects, and there 
just happens to be a consistent correspondence between the presence of 
the object and the experience. (It is not that natural processes “happen 
to have produced a correspondence” as some sort of causal connection 
between the perceiver and the perceived. The correspondence itself must 
be a brute fact.)
This seems a very strange story to tell about perceptual knowledge. On 
this theory the experience that we would ordinarily describe as “seeing a 
tree” seems bett er put as “having a tree-seeing experience,” since there is 
absolutely no connection between you, the perceiver, and the tree. And 
if this is the story you tell about perceptual knowledge, then you invite 
skepticism. The scenario entails the possibility that natural processes have 
thrown up perceptions without the corresponding objects. Your theory 
says that the objects are there, but it also claims that your knowledge and 
absolutely all the phenomena of your experience are explained without 
any appeal to the reality of the objects.
A theory of the causes of perceptual knowledge which denies any causal 
role to the objects of perception seems a non-starter. Could it be that strongly 
certain belief is so diﬀ erent from perceptual knowledge that, while theories 
about the latt er need to establish a connection between the knower and the 
known, theories about the former do not. The paradigm case of the strongly 
certain belief is “I exist.” Here there seems to be a clear and direct cause of 
the belief—the knower’s immediate presence to himself. But perhaps the 
story is diﬀ erent when the content of the belief is necessary truth. It seems 
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to me that the burden of proof here is on the one who would deny the 
standard requirement that knowledge depend in some way upon the facts 
known. But perhaps the correspondence theory has an argument to show 
that knowledge of necessary truth must be treated diﬀ erently from other 
sorts of knowledge.
One might argue that the fact that 2+2=4 could not possibly fi gure 
in any causal explanation. Joel Pust, developing an argument by David 
Lewis, writes,
we can make litt le sense of the truth-makers of necessary propositions 
being causally implicated in the explanation of any fact, including the 
fact that we have reliable intuitions regarding necessity. . . . This is 
because the counterfactuals upon which such an explanation would 
presumably rest, counterfactuals such as “If 2+2 were not equal to 4, 
then I would not fi nd 2+2=4 intuitive,” are deviant and, on standard 
semantics, uniformly and vacuously true. . . . Hence, a natural strategy 
oft en employed in the realm of contingent truth to show that our opin-
ions depend upon the truth—that of showing that if the facts were 
diﬀ erent, so too would be our opinions—simply has no application to 
the necessary.19
Does this argument show that our knowledge of necessary truth must be 
causally independent of that truth? An alternative conclusion would be 
that there are diﬃ  culties with the analysis of causation which reduces it 
to nothing but counterfactual dependence, and these problems become 
glaring when the question is how we know necessary truth. A general dis-
cussion of the nature of causation would take us too far afi eld. Here I will 
simply suggest that what Pust’s argument actually proves is that some 
claims fi guring in causal explanations resist counterfactual analysis.
In saying that necessary truth can play a constitutive role in a causal 
explanation, I do not mean to say that necessary truth per se or platonic 
abstracta can act as causal agents. But the claim that they can play no 
role at all is false. Suppose I ask my son how it is that I owe him $11. He 
responds that on Friday I borrowed $8 and then last Tuesday I borrowed 
$3, and 8+3=11. He has given me a causal explanation involving not only 
the historical facts of our fi nancial transactions, but an additional piece 
of mathematical information without which the explanation would be 
incomplete. I might jokingly respond, “So if it’s not the case that 8+3=11, 
then I don’t owe you $11!” Of course, if it is not the case that 8+3=11 any-
thing and everything follows. But that does not mean that my son’s ex-
planation is either non-causal or incoherent. And it doesn’t show that 
“8+3=11” was not part of the explanation.
And there are deep problems with saying that the content of the neces-
sary truth does not play a role in the causal explanation of our strongly 
certain beliefs—that there need be no causal connection between the 
knower and the known. The correspondence theorist grants that “2+2=4” 
is not a phenomenon of the spatio-temporal universe. He goes on to hold 
that my strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 is wholly the product of natural 
processes, perhaps beginning with Quine’s “triggering of our nerve end-
ings by light rays and molecules from our environment.” Nerve endings 
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get triggered, a long chain of events occurs in the spatio-temporal uni-
verse, and I come to have the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4. I have no 
doubt that my belief is veridical and utt erly reliable, but is this “triggered 
nerve” theory plausible? (Let the “triggered nerve” stand for the natural 
processes invoked to explain belief.)
It seems in principle to be in the same family with the strained pea 
theory. It gives a causal explanation for how the belief comes to be, and 
it holds that the content of the belief, 2+2=4, plays no role at all in the 
causal history. That being the case, the theory ought to hold that, had 
the natural processes followed a slightly diﬀ erent path, as of course they 
could have done being contingent, a belief with all of the properties of 
a strongly certain belief but with a diﬀ erent content, say “2+2=5,” could 
have resulted. This is impossible.
It will not do to say that there is no problem because the natural pro-
cesses in fact threw up a belief that “2+2=4.”20 Analogous to the strained 
pea theory, the correspondence theory entails that the light rays really could 
have triggered the nerves in a “2+2=5” kind of way. There would then have 
been no correspondence to the truth, but the claim of the theory is that 
every aspect of the belief is explicable through the natural causes which 
simply have no connection to the content of the platonic abstracta. The 
theory entails that the strongly certain belief, with its content and phenom-
enology, would exist as the contingent phenomenon caused by the natural 
processes even if its content were “2+2=5.” And that is impossible. The 
triggered nerve theory, like the strained pea theory, entails an impossible 
consequence, and thus is not a good theory to explain the existence of the 
strongly certain belief.
Naturalism seems unable to provide a causal connection between belief 
and platonic abstracta, and denying the need for some connection, as does 
the correspondence theory, leads to impossible consequences. But does the 
God hypothesis do any bett er? The claim is that God (or a god-like being) 
provides what naturalism is lacking. He is a powerful causal agent who can 
produce human beliefs, and He knows necessary truths necessarily so there 
is no issue of explaining how He came to possess them. No contingent be-
ing—even a powerful angelic spirit, or a lesser god like Zeus—supplies what 
is required here, since for any contingent being, its beliefs must be contingent 
phenomena and hence in need of further causal explanation. It is true that a 
necessarily existent knower with great power might fall short of the God of 
classical theism. Still, the argument points to a being who is at least very god-
like. With the possible exception of Anselm’s Proslogion argument, this is the 
case for all of the att empted proofs and adduced evidence for God.
There are diﬀ erent possible analyses of the relationship of God to neces-
sary truth. The fact that He knows necessary truths necessarily means that 
there is no question of how He came to know them, and that may be enough 
for my purposes here. A full discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
but a brief mention of some of the possibilities should assure the reader that 
the job of providing a coherent analysis can be done.21 I should note that 
Descartes’ suggestion that God somehow “creates” necessary truth is not 
among the viable options, in my opinion. It is subject to the insurmountable 
problem that it places God “above” the laws of logic. But if the laws of logic 
do not apply to God then nothing coherent can be said about Him.22
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Many contemporary philosophers of religion go to the opposite extreme 
and embrace what is in essence the other horn of the logician’s version of 
the Euthyphro problem. If God does not create the laws of logic and math-
ematics, then, it is assumed, such laws must exist independently of God. 
This view might be adequate for my argument here. On the thesis that the 
necessary truths exist independently of God, perhaps the claim that God 
is necessarily omniscient is enough to explain His knowledge of necessary 
truth, and so it may be suﬃ  cient for my present purposes.
From the perspective of (very) traditional theism, though, this position 
demeans God. It reduces Him to the role of a sort of platonic demiurge, 
a being whose knowledge and power must depend upon and conform 
to a “World of the Forms” outside itself. This is not the God of the classi-
cal theism of philosophers like Augustine and Anselm and Aquinas. The 
classical theist God is the absolute source of all. All that exists is God or 
what He makes. On this view, God’s knowledge of necessary truth does 
not depend on anything outside Himself. Rather, He is Perfect Being, 
and necessary truth—the laws of logic and mathematics—are the way 
all being has to be. They refl ect the nature of God. Classical theism holds 
that God is simple—His nature is identifi ed with His omnipotence, His 
omniscience, and His perfect goodness. On this view, not only can there 
be no demand for how God “comes to know” necessary truths, but there 
is no explanation at all for God’s knowledge of necessary truths beyond 
the simple fact of His necessary existence.23
This “anti-platonic” analysis of the relationship of God to necessary 
truth has the further advantage that it does not hypothesize a world of 
ontologically dubious platonic abstracta just “there” in the universe. Ab-
sent God, the platonist understanding of numbers seems preferable to the 
alternative, the claim that numbers are an aspect of the physical universe. 
But nevertheless, the universe of the naturalist who allows this platonic 
realm seems a strange, unparsimonious, and indeed schizophrenic place. 
All of the causal action is set among the objects of perceptual experience, 
but in addition to spatio-temporal things there are these other . . . what? 
Besides the problem of how the abstracta could play a role in the beliefs 
of corporeal creatures such as ourselves, there is an intrinsic puzzle about 
their ontological status. The theist who sees necessary truth as existing 
independently of God seems to face this question as well. What sort of 
“things” are these platonic abstracta? As Robert Adams notes, they seem 
like ideas.24 Classical theism solves the problem by placing necessary truth 
in the mind of God and identifying it with the nature of God. This seems 
to me by far the best move.
There may be various ways to tell the story of how God causes our 
strongly certain beliefs. Perhaps, as Augustine thought, He implants them 
directly in our minds. This may accord best with the phenomenological 
quality of immediacy that I have taken to be characteristic of strongly cer-
tain belief. Perhaps other stories might do the job as well. The most impor-
tant claim is that God is involved as an agent who establishes the required 
causal connection between the believer and the propositions believed.
But if God is omnipotent couldn’t he produce a strongly certain belief in 
a false proposition, “2+2=5” for example? That is, doesn’t the theist hypoth-
esis face the same problem as the correspondence theory and the strained 
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pea theory? No. First note that God is good and would not Himself de-
liberately deceive. But more fundamentally, a strongly certain belief with 
the content “2+2=5” is an impossibility. A belief in “2+2=5” is not veridical 
or luminous, and does not have the sort of immediacy which consists in a 
“grasping” of a fact. The problem with the strained pea theory and the cor-
respondence theory as causal explanations of strongly certain belief is that 
both divorce the content of the belief from the causal processes that pro-
duced it and so could not avoid the impossible entailment that a strongly 
certain belief could have a falsehood as its content. The theist theory, on 
the other hand, insists that only a cause which could “implant” the content 
of necessary truth in our minds could possibly be the source of strongly 
certain belief. God is omnipotent, but omnipotence does not include the 
ability to do the impossible. God is in a position to cause strongly certain 
belief, but this does not entail the impossible consequence that God could 
cause a strongly certain belief in a false proposition.
But doesn’t invoking God as the cause of our strongly certain beliefs 
generate a problem of what might be termed epistemic theodicy? That is, 
the vast majority of our beliefs are held with less than strong certainty. We 
are, in fact, woefully ignorant. Surely if there were a good God who loves 
us and produces our strongly certain beliefs, He would want us to know 
as much of the truth with as much certainty as possible. Undoubtedly 
many beliefs are not of the sort that could be held with strong certainty, 
but couldn’t we have more strongly certain knowledge than we do? Isn’t 
our ignorance evidence that there is no belief-producing God? No. The 
premises of the argument from epistemic evil are weak. For all we know, 
our ignorance may be a necessary part of the divine plan. Perhaps the 
struggle to overcome it is valuable for the development of human virtues. 
And perhaps our ignorance ultimately stems from human free choices so 
God cannot eradicate it without doing damage to the freedom which is a 
terribly important human property. This question in epistemic theodicy 
is amenable to the same sorts of responses that any version of the theist 
problem of evil raises.
Only a god-like being can provide a suﬃ  cient explanation for our 
strongly certain beliefs concerning platonic abstracta (and necessary truth 
in general), and so the existence of such beliefs provides some evidence for 
the existence of God. There are responses open to the committ ed atheist. 
He can simply deny that there are strongly certain beliefs regarding math-
ematical propositions and hold that no belief involving platonic abstracta 
can be held with the proposed unique phenomenology such that the belief 
entails the truth of the proposition believed, is luminous and immediate. 
Possibly it is not the case that 2+2=4. And then he can provide a causal 
history of his belief that 2+2=4 through any of the naturalist theories pro-
posed above. These theories fail as explanations of strongly certain belief, 
but they might succeed as explanations for beliefs of a diﬀ erent sort.
An alternative move would be to grant the strongly certain beliefs about 
mathematical entities, allow the necessity of some connection between the 
believer and the abstracta, but radically revise one’s platonism. One might 
propose that the platonic entities themselves do have some sort of causal 
powers.25 But it is diﬃ  cult to see how “3” might be an agent or interact 
causally with the citizens of the spatio-temporal universe. And a theory 
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depending on a possibly infi nite number of agent abstracta at work in 
the world seems to depart from the empiricist and parsimonious motiva-
tions behind naturalism at least as much as, and perhaps more than, the 
religious thesis.
Another alternative for the atheist is to stick with standard platonism, 
embrace strongly certain beliefs regarding platonic abstracta, and admit 
that they defy explanation. A more optimistic move would be to grant 
that there is not a satisfactory causal story yet. Although now the inherent 
diﬃ  culties of explaining how the contingent phenomena of our physical 
universe could produce strongly certain beliefs about mathematical prop-
ositions seem insurmountable, we may trust that the Science of the Future 
will fi nd a way. These responses are problematic, but one or another seems 
unavoidable for the atheist. Someone who is not powerfully committ ed to 
the non-existence of God, though, granting that we sometimes do have 
strongly certain beliefs about necessary propositions, ought to conclude 
that this provides some evidence for God.26
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